Self-Defence Against Fresh Fruit

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First of all you force him to drop the banana;

- 2 then, second, you eat the banana, thus disarming him.
- 3 You have now rendered him 'elpless.

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And Now for Something Completely Different



How to attack a hash function with a banana

New notion introduced by Aumasson.

Definition ([Aumasson 2010])

A banana is a non-randomness property in a compression function.

See also, distinguisher, pseudo-distinguisher, open-door distinguisher, known-key distinguisher, free-start distinguisher, non-ideality, ...

Easier to pronounce.

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- First of all you find collisions in Q_a with a fixed message;
- 2 then, second, you modify them to collide in AddElements.
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Main idea



- We want no difference in Q_a, no difference in M
- Pick a random pair of x, compute y
- The XOR-difference in x is the XOR-difference in H
- The mod-difference in y is the mod-difference in H
- Solve H from LSB to MSB

Results so far

- ▶ We can achieve collision in Q₀ to Q₂₆ for a small cost
- For a cost of 2³² we can also collide in XH
- This gives a collision in 96 output bits, and strong relations between more bits

Conclusion

	E C	and the second se					
Chaining Value							
6ae0a10c	4f14abca	57e66e71	6075a601	6ae0a10c	4f14abcb	a819918f	9f8a59fe
bba141a1	46fb0506	e001fffd	e89b2ebf	445ebe5f	8934faf9	9ffe0002	e89b2ebf
cb1e82d3	ae2d53d6	cb55b67f	e6b080a1	cb1e82d3	ae2d53d6	34aa4980	194f7f5e
8b8c0a70	98d0080b	adaacc99	88f0cf2d	7473f58f	98d0080b	adaacc99	88f0cf2d
Message							
4f5381d3	f96e7f0a	72879df2	e8150fa2	4f5381d3	f96e7f0a	72879df2	e8150fa2
476caf9f	fbacf685	d1c47cb8	73a7bf61	476caf9f	fbacf685	d1c47cb8	73a7bf61
445261cf	a4c0f69f	a2316fdd	12dbc43a	445261cf	a4c0f69f	a2316fdd	12dbc43a
e5197bf4	af952392	c2966021	46cab397	e5197bf4	af992392	3d699fde	39354c6b
Output							
fe57177e	d1e1157d	ccf82758	6aecc4d0	fe57177e	d1e1157d	ccf82758	80b0c87d
cf3d27ab	590788dc	eafe31d9	0e95fe74	0f1b49b9	e0b92229	cf1c1fb4	1fd1f3ab
5b069cc1	b1039e9e	a5049da0	c38e8490	174ab741	7768d4bc	947374c1	74ddf4f9
cb6f569c	96fff629	ee5d89a4	71e405a4	8b4d7466	d075a056	Of8d8b0c	d987e0cb

Stay tuned for the chocolate strawberry attack!

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