## The cube attack on stream cipher Trivium and quadraticity tests

Piotr Mroczkowski Janusz Szmidt Military Communication Institute Poland

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## Cube Attack - Papers and Preprints

- Itai Dinur and Adi Shamir. "Cube Attacks on Tweakable Black Box Polynomials", Eurocrypt, 2009
- Michael Vielhaber. "Breaking One. Fivium by AIDA an Algebraic IV Differential Attack", IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2007.
- J-P. Aumasson, W. Meier, I. Dinur, A. Shamir. "Cube testers and key recovery attacks on reduced round MD6 and Trivium", Fast Software Encryption, 2009.
- I. Dinur, A. Shamir. "Side channel cube attacks on block ciphers", IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2009/127.
- P. Mroczkowski, J. Szmidt. The Cube Attack on Courtois Toy Cipher, IACR Cryptology ePrinf Archive, 2009/497.


## Cube Attack

## The structure of the attack

(1) The preprocessing stage

- The attacker can change the values of public and secret variables.
- The task is to obtain a system of quadratic and linear equations on secret variables.
(2) The stage on line of the attack - the key is secret now.
- The attacker can change the values of public variables.
- The task is to obtain the right hand sides of equations.
- The system of equation can be solved giving some bits of the key.


## Boolean functions

- During the preprocessing stage there are analysed Boolean functions $f\left(x_{0}, x_{1} \ldots, x_{n-1}\right)$ depending on $n$ secret variables (bits of the key) appearing in the process of summation over $k$-dimensional cubes in public variables; $0<k<n-1$.
- The task is to detect the cases where these functions are affine ones:

$$
f\left(x_{0}, \ldots, x_{n-1}\right)=\bigoplus_{0 \leqslant i \leqslant n-1} a_{i} x_{i} \oplus c
$$

where $a_{0}, \ldots, a_{n-1}, c$ are binary coefficients.

## Boolean functions, cont.

- And to detect other cases where these functions are quadratic ones:

$$
f\left(x_{0}, \ldots, x_{n-1}\right)=\bigoplus_{0 \leqslant i<j \leqslant n-1} a_{i j} x_{i} x_{j} \oplus \bigoplus_{0 \leqslant i \leqslant n-1} a_{i} x_{i} \oplus c
$$

where $a_{i j}, a_{i}, c$ are binary coefficients.

- Affine functions are recognized by applying the lenearity tests:

$$
f\left(x \oplus x^{\prime}\right)=f(x) \oplus f\left(x^{\prime}\right) \oplus f(0)
$$

for chosen values of collections of secret variables:
$x=\left(x_{0}, \ldots, x_{n-1}\right), x^{\prime}=\left(x_{0}^{\prime}, \ldots, x_{n-1}^{\prime}\right)$.

## Boolean functions, cont.

- And to recognize quadratic functions we apply the quadraticity tests:

$$
\begin{gathered}
f\left(x \oplus x^{\prime} \oplus x^{\prime \prime}\right)=f\left(x \oplus x^{\prime}\right) \oplus f\left(x \oplus x^{\prime \prime}\right) \oplus f\left(x^{\prime} \oplus x^{\prime \prime}\right) \\
\oplus f(x) \oplus f\left(x^{\prime}\right) \oplus f\left(x^{\prime \prime}\right) \oplus f(0)
\end{gathered}
$$

for chosen values of collections of secret variables: $x=$ $\left(x_{0}, \ldots, x_{n-1}\right), x^{\prime}=\left(x_{0}^{\prime}, \ldots, x_{n-1}^{\prime}\right), x^{\prime \prime}=\left(x_{0}^{\prime \prime}, \ldots, x_{n-1}^{\prime \prime}\right)$.

- The binary coefficients in Algebraic Normal Forms of Boolean functions are calculated by summing over suitable cubes.


## Trivium stream cipher, cont.

We applied the above process to Trivium stream cipher with reduced number ( $740 \div 752$ ) of initialization rounds. Here there are sample examples of obtained quadratic equations for bits of secret key: 745, $\{2,3,5,6,11,13,16,18,20,22,24,26,27,28,33,34,35,36,42$, $45,50,52,55,59,62,63,64,69,70,73\}, \times 8+\times 35+\times 9 \times 10=1$ 746, $\{3,4,6,7,12,14,17,19,21,23,25,27,28,29,34,35,36,37,43$, $46,51,53,56,60,63,64,65,70,71,74\}, \times 9+\times 36+\times 10 \times 11=1$

## Trivium stream cipher, cont.

747, $\{4,5,7,8,13,15,18,20,22,24,26,28,29,30,35,36,37,38,44$, $47,52,54,57,61,64,65,66,71,72,75\}, \times 10+x 37+x 11 \times 12=1$ 748, $\{5,6,8,9,14,16,19,21,23,25,27,29,30,31,36,37,38,39,45$, $48,53,55,58,62,65,66,67,72,73,76\}, x 11+x 38+x 12 \times 13=1$ 749, $\{6,7,9,10,15,17,20,22,24,26,28,30,31,32,37,38,39,40,46$, $49,54,56,59,63,66,67,68,73,74,77\}, \times 12+x 39+x 13 \times 14=1$ 750, $\{7,8,10,11,16,18,21,23,25,27,29,31,32,33,38,39,40,41,47$, $50,55,57,60,64,67,68,69,74,75,78\}, x 13+x 40+x 14 \times 15=1$ 751, $\{8,9,11,12,17,19,22,24,26,28,30,32,33,34,39,40,41,42,48$, $51,56,58,61,65,68,69,70,75,76,79\}, x 14+x 41+x 15 \times 16=1$ 742, $\{0,9,10,11,14,23,24,26,27,30,34,36,39,40,42,44,45,47,48$, $49,51,54,63,64,65,66,67,69,74,77\}, x 16+x 43+x 17 \times 18=1$ $743,\{1,10,11,12,15,24,25,27,28,31,35,37,40,41,43,45,46,48$, $49,50,52,55,64,65,66,67,68,70,75,78\}, x 17+x 44+x 18 \times 19=0$

## Trivium stream cipher, cont.

740, $\{1,5,7,8,10,13,14,20,22,34,38,39,40,45,46,48,52,56,57,58$, $60,62,63,64,65,66,69,75,78,79\}, \times 18 \times 23=0$ 744, $\{1,2,4,6,11,12,18,26,34,36,38,48,50,53,54,55,56,57,58,59$, $60,61,62,64,67,68,71,73,76,77\}, x 17+x 59+x 60 \times 61=1$ 752 , $\{0,2,5,7,14,21,23,25,28,29,32,37,39,40,43,44,46,48,56,58$, $59,60,63,67,69,70,75,76,77,79\}, x 0+x 27+x 1 \times 2=1$ We used fast implementation of Trivium in Python - 128 independent key streams.
Paul Crowley, Trivium, SSE2, CorePy, and the cube attack. Published on http://www.Ishift.net/blog/

## Cube attack

## Thank you

